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The 2012 Presidential election pitted the incumbent Barack Obama against the former
Governor of Massachusetts and Republican opponent, Mitt Romney. Fresh off of a historic first
term as the United States’ first and only African-American President, Obama was looking to
secure another four years in the White House. The public faces of these campaigns, however,
blocked from the view of the important, behind the scenes role of political consultants. The
political consulting industry has come to be a main feature of campaigns. In the 2012
Presidential election, “consulting firms billed federal candidates, parties and super PACs more
than $3.6 billion for products and services. Of this, more than seventy percent went to firms
specializing in the production and placement of media.”2 The amount spent, both from the
campaigns and from outside organizations, far exceeded spending on the placement of
advertisements that occurred in previous elections. Researchers from Wesleyan University found
that “spending by groups in support of the GOP nominee in 2012 is up over 3,000 percent from
2008.”3 Many of these outside groups also hire consultants and other staff to produce, place, and
run advertisements. This includes the background work of message testing, polling, electorate
research, and other work that political consultants and outside firms typically conduct.
Somewhere along the way, campaign ads have been shaped by the influence of a political
consultant. And what type of ads were being placed in 2012? According to the data, attack ads
constituted 63 percent of ads placed supporting Obama and 61 percent ads supporting Romney.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
Researchers have sought to define negative or attack advertisements since they first
appeared in the arsenals of political candidates. In 2012, Jason Johnson identified a theme
common among researchers studying negative ads: the failure to ask the ad creators themselves
how they define the term. Johnson proposed new definitions for the terms “negative” and
“attack” advertising, based on the responses of political consultants:
Negative advertising is simply any message criticizing your opponent, with whatever
materials you have, with whatever evidence you have, so long as it is the truth and at
least tangentially relevant to the campaign…[attack advertisements are] any messages in
political campaigns that are factually untrue and that focus on issues that cannot be
readily understood as relevant to the campaign. 4
While these definitions are widely accepted, the dataset that I am using from the Wesleyan
Media Project does not have a variable for “negative” ads. Furthermore, the Project fails clearly
to define their criteria for assigning the terms “negative” or “attack.” I will therefore adopt
Johnson’s definition for “negative” ads into this definition for “attack” ads, to mean “any
messages that criticize your opponent, that may or may not be untrue, but has intention of
causing harm to your opponent’s image.” Throughout this paper, the terms negative and attack
will be used interchangeably.

Although research on the topic of political advertising has shown that “the effect of
campaign negativity on the political process is ambiguous,” the existence of a highly partisan
electorate warrants the discussion of how political consultants may affect this phenomenon
through negative ads.5 Although some have found that attack ads have little tangible effect on the
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electorate, there are models that researchers have developed to show that political advertisements
do, in fact, effect the electorate. These come in the form of the minimal effects model, and the
subtle effects model. Both models are still used today to explain media effects on the populace,
and inevitably help to explain how negative ads can have an effect on voters.
The “Minimal Effects Model” attempts to determine the influence the media plays on
citizens. During the Presidential campaign of 1940 researchers Paul Lazarsfeld, Barnard
Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet conducted a 6-month study with 600 citizens living in Erie County,
Ohio in order to “assess the campaign messages that were circulating in the local media
environment and examine what effect, if any, those messages had on voters.” 6 They found that
50 percent of the interviewees who had decided their preferred candidate in May, voted that way
in November. Lazarsfeld and colleagues coined the term “reinforcement effect” to describe the
lack of change in opinion, arguing that the campaign messages viewers watched served to
strengthen their commitment to their initial decision. 7 Similar to the “minimal effects” model is
the “activation effect” which posits that citizens who were unsure of who to vote for in
November paid more attention to the election once being exposed to campaign messages.
However, “citizens did not pay attention to all aspects of the campaigns. Instead, citizens honed
in on particular magazine articles and newspaper stories that corresponded with their political
predispositions.”8 In other words, the presence of political messages served to reinforce partisan
beliefs while also encouraging those with political biases to seek out media and information
reinforcing that bias. The placement of advertisements during television and news programs that
draw partisan viewership could therefore have the same effect today. When those advertisements
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are negative or attack ads there is reason to believe that feelings of anger and disparagement
towards the opposite political party could be reinforced, while also encouraging the search for
news sources that then reinforce this view.
The subtle effects model is another method to explain media influence. This model
embodies the processes of framing, agenda setting, and priming that take places during electoral
campaigns. The model contends that public influence can be swayed by the media through “(1)
affecting what the public thinks about, (2) affecting which issues and traits shape the evaluation
of leaders, and (3) affecting which considerations are viewed as most important when assessing a
political issue.”9 In the context of this research, the use of negative advertisements could have an
effect through this model. Through the first step of agenda setting, negative and attack
advertisements inform the public what policies and issues to think about during the campaign.
Exposure to these types of ads could create the impression that the election is a battle for the
future of America, or any similar metaphor. The second process in this model is the process of
“priming,” where voters determine which candidate to support based on the issues that the media
has portrayed as the most important. 10 Again, the use of negative advertisements in this model
could have the effect of establishing issues that draw partisan vitriol (such as abortion,
immigration, LGBTQ rights) as the main issue to judge candidates on. The third step in the
process is “framing,” which serves to “identify which aspects of a problem are relevant and
important, and they imply which characteristics of a problem are not significant.” 11 This third
step can be exampled through an advertisement that focusses on immigration. An important issue
to Republican base voters might be border security, deportation of illegal immigrants, and
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preventing illegal immigrants from using social services. To appeal to a Democratic base,
progressive policies towards immigrants would be emphasized. Meanwhile, the drawback of
each party could also be expressed. This has the effect of reinforcing in the minds of Republicans
or Democrats the solution and problems that their party proposes, along with building upon
attitudes towards the other parties’ candidates who may not focus on aspects of a problem that
appeal to their opposition.
Another factor in campaign advertising that researchers have started to take notice of is
fear. Travis N. Ridout and Michael M. Franz note that “one may need to move beyond the
traditional categorization of ads as positive or negative to consider the specific emotions they
elicit.”12 Franz and Ridout’s data shows that during the 2004 Senate and Presidential elections,
fear and anger were the most common emotional appeals made in attack ads, across both major
parties and both Congressional and Presidential contests. 13 Furthermore, Corrigan and Brader
note that political consultants themselves have advocated for the use of fear in ads.14
Consultants sit in an industry which can inspire the effects of the minimal and subtle
effects model in their political advertisements. Yet, while researchers have framed the agenda
setting and polling activities of consultants in a negative light, other, more recent work, contend
that these practices ensure a more robust democracy. Lake notes that elevating issues during a
campaign that the people care most about will help contrast candidates and involve voters in the
race.15 Dulio mentions that many scholars on the subject have assumed that consultants tell
candidates which view to take on issues in order to win. Dulio contends, however, that,
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“…pollsters do not use survey research to tell candidates how or what to think about issues, but
help candidates find issues and language that best describes what the candidate will do once
elected.”16 According to Dulio, candidates decide what stance to take on an issue, consultants
simply find a way to make that stance more politically acceptable. The idea that consultants are
recruiters who, “… look for people who have orientations like their own, who will rely on
research information, be able to use the mass media, and who have or are able to raise money,” is
demonstrably false, according to Dulio.17
The arguments made above paint a picture of political advertising as mildly effective
psychologically, but I want to take the question out of the theory and see what the data says
about the use of negative or attack ads. Whether or not political ads are effective––as the theories
above attempted to explain––is important. Likewise, it is also important to know what types of
are used the most and attempt to find out why. I also want to find out how the placing of negative
and attack ads work in real life. I will attempt to answer the first question by looking at campaign
advertisements from the 2012 presidential election in the state of Michigan. This data, compared
with voting history of the region, will give us an image of any relationship between the two. I
will also consider the question of how consultants understand the work that they do in the
placing and recommending the use of negative or attack ads.
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METHODS
There are a number of important assumptions that I will be making throughout this
research. First, I will assume that any political advertisement placed in Michigan during the 2012
presidential general election was the work of a political consultant. I will also assume that
television advertisements are the best source to use to analyze the impact of campaign
advertisements. A 2012 survey found that 67% of respondents reported having received “most
of” their news from television sources during the 2012 presidential election.18 Therefore, it
seems reasonable to assume that citizens were exposed to campaign commercials and that they
used them to make judgements on the respective candidates.
The main questions to be asked in this research are: what does the data say about negative
or attack ads, and who is to blame for placing negative/attack advertisements? I will use data
compiled by the Wesleyan University Media Project to attempt to answer the first question. This
project has been tracking and coding federal election campaign advertisements since 2010, with
Kantar Media and their Campaign Media Analysis Group (CMAG) serving as Wesleyan’s
source. The Wesleyan Media Project sends out collectors––along with CMAG––to analyze and
report on advertisements in all media markets using technology that can identify certain
characteristics of the ad including the sponsor and program it was placed on. 19 Advertising data
and the video files are then sent to Wesleyan project staff, who then:
[R]esearch the entity responsible for airing each political spot, distinguishing between those paid
for by candidates, parties, and interest groups. Finally, the Wesleyan Media Project codes the
content of each ad on an extensive battery of questions using a web-based content analysis
platform called Academiclip, a CommIT media research application. 20

“Pew Research Poll Database,” Question Search, Pew Research Center, Accessed April 4, 2019,
https://www.pewresearch.org/question-search/
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Further detail on the variables chosen will be given before the discussion of the case study.
The answer to my second research question will be explored through a survey of political
consultants. To compile a random sample for the survey, I identified 40 Republican, 40
Democratic, and 30 Independent consulting firms. I identified the partisanship and contact
information of these firms from the American Association of Political Consultants and
Campaigns & Elections websites. After compiling these lists, I assigned each a number, and used
a random number generator to pull a sample size of 60 consultants to contact. I made sure to pull
equal proportions of Democrat, Republican, and Independent consultants. Of those 60
consultants, 29 responded to every question on my survey, for a total N=29 (See Appendix for
the survey) The survey also asked if the consultants would be willing to conduct an interview;
based on those responses I then conducted telephone interviews with six consultants. I am fairly
confident that I have a random sample of political consultants. The consultants I surveyed ranged
in the political spectrum, stretched from coast to coast, including plenty in the middle of the
country, and spanned specialties from public affairs, digital strategists, full-service campaign
firms, ballot initiative strategists, and more.

9
RESULTS
Analysis of the 2012 Election
As I noted earlier in the paper, $3.6 billion was billed to political consulting firms in the
2012 election, with more than 70% going to the production and placement of media.21 While this
category includes media placed on social media, radio, and newspapers, an extraordinary amount
was still spent on television advertisements. There was one stark difference between the way the
two campaigns spent on advertising.

Table 1 2012 Advertising Totals. *By Political Action Committees with Known Ties to the Candidate

As Table 1 shows, the Romney campaign spent much less of its own money on television
advertisements. This is essentially the opposite of how the Obama campaign spent on its ads.
Romney’s campaign spent less and relied more on outside groups placing ads on their behalf;
meanwhile, Obama’s campaign spent large amounts, over $163 million, while receiving less than
half that in support from independent expenditures.

21

Adam Sheingate, “The Political Consultant Racket,” The New York Times.
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The Mitten State: A Case Study
How the Candidates Advertised 22
There are 11 designated market areas (DMAs) within the state of Michigan (see Figure
123). Three of these media markets are located around the metropolitan areas of cities in different
states, yet include one or two counties within MI. Only the DMAs of South Bend and Alpena
were not included in the data that I am using. The Detroit DMA–– as described below––will be
excluded from my data. I will therefore analyze data from 8 DMA’s within the state of Michigan.

Figure 1: Map of Michigan Designated Market Areas (DMAs)
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Using the data from Wesleyan, I identified and created dummy variables for the various
media markets within MI. I eliminated the most populous DMA of Detroit to ensure when I ran a
regression analysis that there was no large populous that could skew the results. I then chose five
variables with which to run cross tabulations between certain MI DMA’s and the various types
of ads I wanted to observe. These variables were: attack ads, ads that focused on personal
characteristics over policy, ads that appealed to fear, ads that showed disapproval of Obama, and
who the ad supported: Obama or Romney. While I could not find strict definitions on the
Wesleyan Media Project website, I was able to come up with the following definitions of these
ads. Attack ads in this paper will be defined as, “Any form of communication, whether true or
untrue, that criticizes the opponent while highlighting issues not easily tied to the campaign.”
Ads that focus on personal characteristics are relatively easy to explain; these would be ads that
focus on the personal lives, habits, or even families of candidates. Choosing ads that appeal to
fear was a decision made after speaking to consultants, who shall be profiled later, and learning
that these types of ads are becoming more common. There were no ads coded for disapproval of
Romney, which is why we will only be observing the disapproval of Obama ads. Finally,
determining who placed the most ads on behalf of the two candidates will give a clear look at
who was busiest in the area. It is also important to note that ads may be coded as two variables,
and all of the data refers solely to television advertisements.
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Types of Advertisements within the Designated Market Areas
In total, there were 82,361 campaign advertisements placed within in the eight DMA’s
during the 2012 election. Table 2 provides details on the proportion of attack ads, ads that appeal
to fear, ads that show disapproval of Obama,
personal over policy ads, and which proportion of
ads supported which party. The largest proportion
of ad type present actually came from those ads
that were placed in support of the Republican
candidate, Mitt Romney. His supporters were out in
force and placed 69% of the total ads, while
Democrat supporters placed the remaining 31% of
the ads in these DMAs. One statistic that surprised
me was the low proportion of ads that focused on a
candidate’s personal aspects. Throughout much of
my research, a common thread among those early
researchers of the industry was the claim that

Table 2 Total Ad Placement in Michigan

political consultants are slowly turning elections from policy contests into personality ones.
However, this data point shows that this really may not be the case. Although these ads are
present, this 6% is broken up between each of the eight DMAs, so the presence of them is even
much smaller when looked at that way. I was not, however, shocked by the high proportion of
attack ads, at 62%. Many consultants, as will be shown later, told me that they recommend the
use of these ads, under the right circumstances. Clearly, some of the circumstances in this
presidential contest could have warranted the use of these ads.
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Party of Favored Candidates

Figure 2 Party of Favored Candidate

Observing which parties placed advertisements in support of their candidate in 2012 will
better help to determine a few characteristics of the DMA’s in this case study. The most
important being the political competitiveness of the state of Michigan. The Marquette DMA
encompasses the rural surroundings––10 counties worth––of one of the larger cities in the Upper
Peninsula (UP) of MI. This DMA would appear to fit the rural image of Republican voters,
however this DMA’s counties largely voted for Obama in 2008. Maybe because of this voting
history, there were absolutely no ads placed in this DMA to support then-President Obama in
2012 (see Figure 2). In the 2012 election, only 1 county in this DMA maintained support for the
Democratic candidate. The DMA’s (see Figure 2) of Traverse City, Grand Rapids, Flint, and
Lansing, were heavily bombarded with Romney supporting ads. While those DMA’s that fell
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entirely within the state experienced plenty of Republican ads, it appears that Obama’s
Democratic campaign largely ignored these types of DMAs.

Attack Ads:

Figure 3 Attack Advertisements

There was a total of 52,491 attack ads placed in these 8 DMA’s. Figure 3 depicts the
proportion of attack ads present in each market area. Marquette, which we saw had no ads placed
by Democrat supporters, had the highest proportion of attack ads present, at 80%. Obviously,
these must have been placed by Romney supporters. Duluth includes one county in MI, that of
Gogebic, and is located on the far east side of the UP, sharing a border with Wisconsin and
sitting on the edge of Lake Michigan. Obama won the county in 2008, besting McCain. In 2012,
Obama still won the county; however, he did lose 600 votes between the two elections. There is
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a reason then for Republicans placing a high number of advertisements within this DMA. As an
area that voted for Obama in 2008 by a fairly large margin, the Republican Party and their
supporters were most likely interested in siphoning off some of these voters. On the Democratic
side, the large margin of victory in 2008 probably led to a confidence that Gogebic County
would follow that trend in 2012. The general trend can be clearly seen in the high proportions of
attack ads being placed in these DMAs. The DMA with the lowest proportion of attack ads was
that of Toledo, where 62% of ads placed fell into this category. This DMA actually had more
advertisements placed by Democrats than Republicans (see Figure2). This leads me to
hypothesize that consultants and advisors decided to place fewer attack ads here since it was
relatively competitive and so as not to alienate the other side. There was a similar proportion
placed in Green Bay (see Figure 3), a DMA that also saw a closer proportion of television ads
aired by both campaigns (see Figure 2). No DMA in this case study saw a proportion of attack
ads that was less than 60%, and those DMA’s that aligned closer with this percentage followed
the trend of being advertised in by both candidates’ supporters.

16
Ads Showing Disapproval of Obama

Figure 2 Ads That Show Disapproval of Obama

Figure 4 Ads Showing Disapproval of Obama

There were 43,763 political advertisements framed in order to show disapproval or
opposition to then-President Barack Obama. This is not surprising; He was the incumbent officeholder at the time––a target for anyone seeking the same office. The DMA of Toledo had one of
the two lowest proportion of ads placed showing disapproval of Obama, at 42% (see Figure 4).
This DMA is another one that only includes one county in MI. This one is located in the
southeast portion of the state (see Figure 1), and is relatively rural, besides including the college
town of Adrian. This DMA was advertised heavily by both Democrats and Republicans (see
Figure 2), possibly accounting for the low number of these types of ads. However, Republican
supporters might have this seen county as convertible––Obama won in 2008 while Romney did
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in 2012. Lansing received a large proportion of ads showing disapproval of Obama (see Figure
4), which makes sense considering only 4% of ads here were placed by Democrat supporters (see
Figure 2). Overall, the DMA’s in our study by and large received large proportions of ads that
were meant to criticize the incumbent President, and they were aimed at areas where Democratic
operatives failed to place ads. The Traverse City DMA received a large proportion of these
commercials showing President Obama in a bad light (see Figure 4). Traverse City was heavily
advertised by Romney supporters (see figure 2) and the 25 counties that fall within the market
would have been a Republican target. In 2008, eight out of the 25 counties supported thencandidate Obama. The vulnerability would be clear, and there were largely no Democratic
supporting ads placed here. In 2012, only 2 counties supported Obama. If this was the
Republican consultants’ goal, they surely achieved it.

18
Ads That Appeal to Fear

Figure 5 Ads That Appeal to Fear

The consultants that I interviewed and my research on the topic consistently described the
effect that an ad that appeals to fear could have on driving voters to the polls. According to one
consultant, this tactic has become common strategy throughout their party. So, was the emotion
of fear used throughout our DMA’s to drive people to the polls? First, the total number of ads
that appealed to fear in our DMA was 23, 449. Campaigns are clearly still employing a larger
amount of attack ads, yet fear is also used in plenty of ads. The DMA of Flint-Saginaw includes
two industrial cities in the heart and ‘thumb’ of Michigan. Flint, in particular, has become well
known throughout the nation due to the presence of dangerous levels of lead in their drinking
water. Figure 2 shows that 97% of the ads placed here were by Romney supporters. However, as
Figure 5 above shows, there was a relatively low percentage of these types of ads placed. In fact,
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the highest proportion of these ads came from DMA’s that included only one county in MI,
Duluth, Toledo, and Green Bay. Duluth deserves mention as they received the largest proportion
of fear ads. There is a large chance that at least some of there were placed by Republican and
Democratic campaigners, as this DMA received advertising from both parties’ supporters (see
Figure 2).

Personal Ads

Figure 6 Personal Over Policy Ads

In the early years of political consulting, many feared that these “political tricksters”
would turn elections from policy battles into personality contests. However, the data largely
shows that these concerns are an overreaction to a yet to be understood industry. Conversations
with consultants will later reveal that by and large, these types of ads are not commonly
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recommended. Green Bay is the most competitive of the DMA’s we are observing (see Figure
2), despite that, only 11% of the ads placed here focus on a candidate’s personal aspects (See
Figure 6). The DMA of Green Bay includes, again, only one county in MI, located by Wisconsin
and Lake Michigan. This county voted for Obama in 2008 and it’s possible that some data told
consultants that this area might be susceptible to these types of ads. While Duluth and Green bay
both had the highest proportions of personal ads (see Figure 6), the other DMAs, including
Grand Rapids, had low proportions. The Grand-Rapids DMA is named after one of the largest
and fastest growing cities in MI. Located in the western part of the state, 6 out of 13 counties in
the Grand Rapids DMA voted for Obama in 2008, but in 2012 9 out of the 13 counties supported
Romney. Overall, those counties that were heavily advertised by Republican supporters,
including Marquette, Traverse City, Lansing, and Flint, also had a low number of personal ads
placed. Duluth, however, where 14% of ads placed supported Obama (see Figure 2), 20% of
campaign ads focused on an opponent’s personal aspects (see Figure 6). This leads me to believe
that operatives on the Republican side might not have been expecting this much Democratic ad
placement here, and as a result went for these types of ads. However, the low number of personal
ads causes me to think that the wariness of the consultants I interviewed to place any type of ad
containing a personal attack, extends to others I did not speak with. However, the presence of
these ads should not be discounted. They are evidence that some consultants, with their
candidate’s approvals, are still willing to place advertisements against an opponent focused on
personality over policy.

21
The People Behind the Ads
In order to get a more nuanced understanding of political consulting I conducted a survey
of political consultants and followed up with personal interviews (see Appendix for survey). I
received responses from a wide array of political consultants, including digital advertisers,
campaign managers, message strategist, media specialists, and from Democratic, Republican,
and Independent consultants. Furthermore, the consultants that I interviewed and surveyed were
spread across the country, with representatives from each geographical region. In order to
receive a thorough understanding of how political consultants operate, I asked those that I
interviewed to give me a brief overview of how they see their role in a campaign. Many of the
answers were very client focused, with respondents consistently mentioning how best to serve
their client; “I think my role in all of this is in ensuring that my candidates… run the best race
they possibly can. My role is to use my experience and my skills to help you run a solid race and
be the best candidate you can be.” 24 I also got the sense that political consultant largely serves as
a sort of translator between complicated public opinion research and candidates and campaigns.
“A lot of my work is driven by public opinion research. What are the arguments that lead people
to vote yes…What are the arguments that move people?”25 In this response, we see the data
driven message strategists that earlier researchers described and lamented. Polling is conducted
in order to test campaign messages, wording, and themes on a certain population similar to the
one the candidates will be advertising. The reliance on data was confirmed again by one
interviewee, “We’ll dig deep into the polling… And that’s what drives my recommendations to
the client.”26 Consultants take the polling data that they receive, take the platform of their

24
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candidate, and combine both aspects to ensure a message and strategy that resonates with voters.
Whether this leads to the placement of negative or attack advertisements, however, is much more
nuanced, and will be discussed in further detail later.

The second question asked consultants which party most of their clients belong to. Figure
7 below shows the variety of clients that these consultants serve. This chart is interesting for a
few reasons. First, it shows that many consultants in my sample work with candidates from the
same party as themselves. It is possible that these consultants truly entered the profession in
order to further their political beliefs. Early writers labored over the idea that political
consultants entered the industry to make money. While money may be a benefit, it is also likely
that the consultants at least support what they work for.

Figure 7 Partisan Background of Political Consultant’s Clients
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Figure 7 also shows that 13% of the consultants fall in the “other” category of respondents who
work in non-partisan elections, issue campaigns, public affairs, or even work for candidates from
all political leanings in figure 7. While there are those who will stick with their party, a
proportion of our consultants will work with clients of any political stripe.

The question of how consultants understand the impact of negative ads gets to the root of
what I am looking at in this paper. If negative ads weren’t effective, then there would be no need
to place them. However, as was seen in the advertising data and Figure 3, many of our DMA’s
contained a large proportion of these types of ads. What do the message creators and placers of
these attack ads have to say about their use? There was a wide range of responses among the
consultants on how effective, in their opinion, these ads are. Figure 8 shows that my respondents
saw this as a complex issue. Only 21% reported that these ads, at face value, are more effective
than other types of political campaign materials. The largest category of respondents came from
those who wrote in answers that largely fell under the category of negative/attack ads
effectiveness being influenced by a number of factors. One respondent wrote, “It depends on the
candidate, the opposition, the political climate, the district.” 27 However, “Well produced, factbased negative ads can be very effective under the right political environment.” 28 An interview
respondent made the connection between data use and ad effectiveness, writing, noted “…It’s
been extraordinarily effective as long as you understand as the consultant or the campaign
manager or the candidate, what it is you are actually going to get out of negative ads… Many
people don’t understand what a negative advertisement actually accomplishes.” 29 In this case,
understanding what the ad will accomplish can come from looking at public opinion data and
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determining whether the electorate is susceptible to these types of commercials. One consultant
felt that the effectiveness of negative or attack ads is influenced by partisanship: “It used to be

Figure 8 Consultant's Views on Effectiveness of Negative or Attack Ads

most effective for Republicans but it’s becoming just as effective for Democrats.” 30 Overall, the
climate of the race, political situation, election context, and other factors were seen as playing an
integral role in the effectiveness of ads.
One respondent went even further, stating that I may have been asking the
“Wrong question…. the terms ‘negative’ or ‘attack’ must be defined before answering this
question. Because voters certainly have clear definitions of what they find to be an ‘attack’ and
it's not the same as most analysts and media think.”31 During a following interview, we went
into further detail on this response. The consultant told a story about an election wherein they
placed mail, digital, and television advertisements that were heavily contrasting and negative;
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“What we said about her was completely negative.” However, these negative/attack ads were not
received in the way that many would anticipate; business owners approached the consultant and
complimented him on the positivity of his campaign, applauding the fact that the candidate had
never gone negative. The consultant explained, “If it’s about issues that people care about, that
they feel like they legitimately want to make their voting decision based on that issue, they don’t
consider that an attack.” However, if an ad doesn’t focus on relevant issues, “[I]f it feels mean
spirited…acts mean spirited, then that’s an attack.” 32
The idea that the definition of negative or attack ads offered by researchers and
consultants differs from how voters and viewers define and categorize political ads is interesting.
After all, political advertisements are created for the voters, not the consultants. Therefore, Jason
Johnson and I may both be mistaken in looking to political consultants to assign definitions
between “negative” and “attack,” the voters may be the ones who should decide the definition.
Overall, there are a number of different factors that can influence the effectiveness of negative or
attack advertisements, including public opinion data, the opponent’s strategy, the issues in a
campaign, and more. To better understand the effectiveness of ads however, future research
should first start by identifying how voters define the different types of political ads.

The next question on my survey asked whether or not the consultants believe that
negative/attack ads actually affect how people view the candidates. Figure 9 shows a clear
majority of respondents thought that the ads did affect voters’ views of the candidates. Only 3%
of consultants felt the opposite. Again, there is a category of answers that can easily fall under
the label of “it depends”. Similar to the last question, these responses largely pointed out that
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whether or not a candidate’s image can be harmed relies on numerous factors. One consultant
wrote in “Yes if they are credible––no if they seem contrived.”33 This response placed trust in
the electorate that they are able to differentiate between negative or attack ads that display the

Figure 9 Does Negative Advertising Affect Views of Candidates?

truth as compared to those that make up lies about an opponent. Another respondent noted
“[Having an effect on voter’s views of the candidate] Depends on the message with the
advertising. Some ‘negatives’ can actually reflect worse on the candidate rolling them out versus
their target if the message is too aggressive.”34 This last response was another common thread
throughout my research; there was general wariness in placing ads that were deemed as being
extremely negative or abrasive.
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In the subsequent interviews, one of the consultants maintained their reliance on polling
and public opinion data to determine whether or not a particular message or ad type will work.
This is conducted before the television commercial is placed on air and involves diligent and
complex work. One interviewee pointed to a race where negative ads might be more effective at
damaging an opponent’s image “usually its if you’re going against an incumbent you got to bring
them down a peg or two and give voters a reason to fire these people.”35 This should remind
readers of the data on advertisements that were meant to show disapproval of Obama. Clearly, as
an incumbent, he was a top target for Republican advertisements. Figure 4 shows that large
proportions of these ads were placed in areas almost exclusively advertised in by Romney
supporters, attempting to knock Obama down “a peg or two.”
As we have seen throughout this essay, consultants often conclude that the political
context is important for the success of negative ads. When I asked one consultant specifically
whether they believe that negative or attack advertisements work best with those who identify as
“extremely liberal” or “extremely conservative,” the answer was a clear and simple, “Yes.” 36
Another interviewee concluded that effectiveness was also split on party lines, “Negativity
overall has always been more effective in the Republican side… but it was almost a plank of the
Republican party platform, that was not the case as broadly with Democrats, now that’s
changing.”37 Other consultants I spoke with disagreed however there were still attack ads and
other types placed in DMA’s in proportions by the two parties. Whether or not Democrats
started placing these ads recently, they certainly were in 2012.
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The validity of claims made about negative or attack advertisements was seen as another
factor in these ads affecting voter’s views of candidates. One consultant I spoke to felt that the
bar was higher for truth telling as a Republican consultant in a largely Democrat state; “We try to
be really careful about that honesty and how we’re talking about the truth, because we know that
we’re going to be scrutinized much more intensely by opposition.” 38 Telling an easily
debunkable lie during a campaign in an area dominated by members of the other party, is a very
clear way to lose an election. While this consultant may feel held to a higher stand because of
geography, many consultants also said, through the survey and interviews, that placing outright
lies in an advertisement is not a good strategy.
We have seen from the data already that ads focused on personalities over policies are
generally not widely placed. During an interview, one consultant touched on this telling me that
consultants and campaign managers, “[Don’t] separate their decision to go negative based on
personal lifestyles and choices versus policy issues. Those are two different of many different
avenues that a negative advertisement can go through.”39 For this consultant at least, the decision
might not be between the two, and the infrequent use of these types of ads shows other types of
ads are being utilized far more. Ads that focus on a candidates’ personal life may fall under those
types of ads that are considered “too far” for some consultants to recommend placing. Overall,
consultants believe negative or attack advertisements can harm a candidate’s image, as long as
they are rooted in reality, used in a context where they are needed, and appropriate. As one
consultant said in our interview: “If you’re talking about something relevant to their voting
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decision, then its fair game, as long as you do it in a way that comes across as believable.
Credible and relevant, people consider fair.”40

I next wanted to pose some queries to figure out the question that all researchers and
writers on this topic have at one point looked at: if everyone claims to despise negative or attack
ads, why are they still used? I asked the consultants if, in their opinion, negative or attack ads are
now a necessary part of a campaign strategy. The majority of respondents (59%) said “Yes.”
However, only 10% of consultants indicated that such ads were not necessary. Those who did
not affirm a simple yes or no once again referred to the campaign context to answer the question.
One respondent wrote “if I am working for a front-runner with good positives and a weak
challenger, I would not recommend using negative ads.”41 Presumably the need to resort to
negative or attack ads would not be as pressing if there were other issues where the candidate can
more effectively make her or his appeal to voters. A response that reinforces this came from one
subject; “Considered necessary, so expected. But we have many cases of wins with NO negative
advertising.”42 The experience of some consultants, in short, supports the idea that negative or
attack ads are not always necessary. One consultant simply writes that they dislike the use of
these types of ads, writing, “I would say it’s unfortunate that people have to resort to this
behavior.”43 It seems that consultants feel that they are not necessary in all situations and all
strategies yet attack and negative ads are still a viable option in their arsenals.
There was a wide array of answers, but one respondent noted that the medium in which
the ad is placed is also important: “Necessary, but the vehicle through which it’s communicated
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can hedge against political blowback to the campaign putting out the negative pieces.” 44 The
‘vehicles’ that many campaigns use today include mass-emails, social media pages, YouTube
channels, and, a relatively new addition, live-streaming through Facebook and other platforms. A
negative or attack ad placed on Twitter or Facebook in static writing, for instance, may not have
the same effect as seeing a typical negative or attack commercial on television. Seeing a
commercial that eviscerates an opponent, whether based on lies or honesty, could have a much
stronger effect than seeing a candidate post a tweet about their opponent.

What came first, the political consultant or the partisanship? To try and answer this
question I asked consultants whether or not they see themselves as contributing to partisan
animosity. Once again, there was a wide range of responses to this question. As is shown in
Figure 10, 49% of consultants agreed that their industry contributes to partisan animosity. The
next largest category of “other” came from a range of answers. A respondent wrote, “Both.
Political consultants respond to existing animosity, but then use that to build support or
opposition for particular candidates, which contributes to the partisan animosity as well.” 45
Another similarly argued “Consultants only exploit areas where there is a natural divide
occurring. Then they tend to exacerbate it in their efforts to exploit that divide to benefit their
clients.”46 Contributing to partisan animosity, according to these consultants, is their use of
dividing issues to win support to their cause. If there were no existing partisan divides, then there
would be no ability to manufacture it. My interviews largely confirmed this idea. One respondent
noted the new forms of digital advertisements where, “[W]e just have so much more information
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at our fingertips now than we ever have before. With smart strategist you can kind of deploy
those attack messages in a much more micro way than we have before.” 47 Political consultants
now possess not only the knowledge of which partisan issues to push, but where to place the ads
to pinpoint those they have identified as most susceptible to them.
My interviews confirmed this overall impression that the partisan environment is a
product of both a divided electorate and the consultants who seek to win over these voters. One
interviewee told me clearly, “We absolutely did everything we could to take that partisan divide
that existed already, those fears that people had already in their minds, and exploit that to get
them to vote.”48 Another felt strongly that if the electorate stopped responding to negative ads,

Figure 10 Political Consultants on Their Industry Contributing to Partisan
Animosity
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then there would be no need for them. Using the metaphor of fast food restaurants, this
consultant argued that if fast-food chains placed negative ads against each other, they would lose
business, and possibly be boycotted. Therefore, part of the blame might be due to an electorate
that allows candidates to use these types of ads. However, this interviewee was quick to note that
no one entity is to blame: “It’s flawed from the ground up and tends to be a chicken or the egg
argument.”49
The comparison to a fast food restaurant illustrates clearly the cognitive dissonance that
many of us seem to hold. While the attitude behind negative or attack ads are regularly
lambasted by politicians and voters, they are still routinely employed in campaigns. However,
more subjects pointed out “[T]he whole redistricting, how so many states now are so partisan.
There are hardly any moderates getting elected.”50 It is common knowledge that redistricting has
been an issue in the United States. The process of gerrymandering has been undertaken in many
states, including Michigan. Appealing to those who already agree with you, with the addition of
those who fall to the extreme right or left, must contribute to cynicism.
A differing response came from a consultant who noted that “Many I know find it
effective to show their candidate rising above partisan animosity. There are certainly some who
contribute to it – if they see it pushing a constituency to the polls.” 51 Another consultant I
interviewed showed wariness in placing negative or attack ads, “Even if my client really wanted
to go negative…I would say we would try very hard to understand why they are feeling this
way.”52 These two consultants were largely out of the ordinary. Even among those I spoke with
who did not feel the need to place these types of ads, many would do so if the data showed they
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could be effective. The two above signal a possible reaction to the decades of partisan animosity
boiling in the American electorate.

The last two questions I posed to consultants concerned whether they recommend the use
of negative or attack ads, and what their most important consideration is when placing one. 21%
reported that they do recommend the use of these ads. However, a much larger number affirmed
that while they do advise placing these ads, there are certain qualifications that must be
considered. One typical written response noted that it “depends on the dynamics of the race.”53
Some of the dynamics mentioned might include the tactics of the opponent, as another subject
noted, “I usually let the opponent use a negative tactic first, then we attack primarily on their
record.”54 Time and again we see the common theme of context being important. It also apparent
yet again that data and polling are important considerations. A number of consultants wrote that
using data to determine where the opponent has a vulnerability in the electorate affects their
decision.
A number of respondents noted that they would not recommend placing a negative or
attack ad if their candidate is doing well in the race. For instance, one survey participant noted
“If I have a candidate who is far ahead of his/her opponent, then no. If we’re behind, then hell
yes.”55 The need to draw down a candidate who is doing far better than you in the polls is seen
easily throughout campaign. The person farthest ahead is like the incumbent: an easy target.
These types of ads often come in play during moments when candidates need to make strong
distinctions between themselves and the opponent. A write in respondent commented about the
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use of negative or attack ads: “Only if completely necessary to illustrate a dramatic difference
between the candidates or to reveal a flaw that merits the attention of the voter.”56 This
consultant signals hesitation to place these ads, but nonetheless, as with most of our respondents,
will place them if the need arises, or “only as a last-ditch effort.”57
What are the most important considerations taken into account when political consultants
place negative or attack ads? We have touched already on their heavy reliance on polling data.
One consultant’s response gives more insight into the process: “Polling results based on the
small sample we tested on the negative messaging, and its impact versus blow back on our
opponent vs. us.”58 Clearly, airing an ad that would put your candidate at a disadvantage would
not be a good idea. One respondent raised a new concern in writing that her consideration is
“How swing voters respond based on research.”59 The fact that some consultants are still
attempting to win swing voters contends with the image of consultants as attempting to only win
their candidate’s base.
Other subjects considered the validity and truthfulness of the content of the ad they would
run as one of their deciding factors. These consultants’ responses largely relied on the theme that
political advertisements “must be based on fact and be believable.”60 Those who believe that
political consultants peddle lies, might be wrong. A respondent wrote, “Truth. That the
opposition candidate has truly shown to have done what will be in the attack ad.”61 There is clear
concern among consultants about the effect of placing something untruthful in an advertisement.
This worry is most likely warranted; if a candidate is caught deliberately spreading lies about
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their opponent, it tends to look much worse on the candidate who sponsored the ad. Another
consultant saw the truth as important but claimed to base his recommendation on whether the
information is pertinent to the voter, “sometimes these can be viewed as ‘attack’ ads but in fact
are simply providing information… As a voter I want to know the facts. Political advertising
should reflect this.”62
There were two responses to this last question which deserve attention One respondent
noted that the most important consideration for themselves was to “make sure negative ads
would be building on an already existing (even if only to a small extent) perception of a
candidate…not creating something negative out of thin air.” 63 Negative or attack ads, therefore,
might not tell lies, but their use is certainly meant to build upon presumably negative perceptions
already held towards someone. It is easier to build upon negativity than to create it, it seems. The
other response stood out to me as it focused on the use of fear; “Fear is a powerful motivator, but
the attack must be substantiated by a real threat, be it ideological or otherwise. Contrived,
personal attacks can backfire.”64 This response focuses on one of the aspects of campaign
advertising that past researchers have found is one of the most effective parts; evoking fear in an
audience. This response clarifies that the threat must be a real threat “ideological or otherwise.”
An ideological threat, for instance, could be the fear of Democrats or Republicans winning back
power from the other party.
The dominant theme in my surveys and interviews is one of men and women who are
very invested in seeing their client-candidates win. However, the charges laid against consultants
that they deliberately spread lies and deceive the public is not held by those I interviewed and
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surveyed. In fact, I got the sense during my telephone interviews with some respondents that
there is a higher standard for the placement of negative ads than other types. The placement of a
negative or attack ad is largely contingent on the data, whether the consultant or their politician
client approves of it, and what sort of campaign the opponent is running. The context of the
race––which candidate is ahead in the polls, whether it is a local race or national one––also plays
an extremely important role in consultant’s decisions.

On Who Decides to go Negative
In my follow up interviews I asked the consultants a question I had not posed in the
survey During a campaign, who decides to go negative, the candidate/politician or the
consultant? Virtually all responded that the actual decision maker is always the candidate; the
campaign is a reflection of themselves. However, the recommendation typically comes from a
consultant or other campaign staffer
Across the board, it was clear that it was, at best, unusual for a client running for office to
approach their political consultants first about the possibility of going negative. One consultant
said, “Very rarely is it a situation where the candidate looks at us and says, ‘Hey I really don’t
like this guy, he said something nasty about my wife in college, I really want to go out and smear
him.’”65 Consultants are typically the first to recommend the use of any type of advertisements.
In fact, may consultants who mentioned this also said that they would be extremely wary of any
candidate who did; “[I]f a candidate right off the bat says they’re willing to go negative then
there is something else going on there. Then their reasons for wanting to be elected are not
necessarily for the greater good.”66 However, there were few who said that some candidates will
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ask. Typically, as I was told, these are the candidates who have been in office before or are
coming from the campaign world.
A candidate or campaign that wants to go negative reinforces some of the early concerns
about the consulting industry. However, the consultants above show that these types of
politicians are not common. In actuality, the recommendation to place a negative or attack ad
generally comes from the consultant. Furthermore, consultant responses show that this
recommendation typically comes after extensive analysis of polling data on the messaging and
content of the ad. One consultant detailed this, “You obviously do your polling and your
messaging and say here’s what we got to do to win, and it’s up to the candidate.”67 As always,
the final decision on placement is left to the final approval of the candidate. Therefore, the
process if fairly simple. Candidates decide they want to run, hire their campaign staff and outside
consultants, who then create a campaign message and strategy, poll this messaging, poll the
electorate, and consultants then recommend the placing of negative or attack ads. Consultants
therefore “place negative ads based on anticipated needs of the campaign and based on
information that points to a trajectory for campaign.”68 This trajectory can either lead to positive
ads being placed or negative/attack ads. Generally, the image of a candidate or consultant
delighting over the placing of negative ads, or doing so for purely personal reasons, is
unfounded.
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CONCLUSION
In the case study, I wanted to look at the state of Michigan to see what the data indicated
about the use of the different types of political ads. What I found was a complete marketing and
advertising blitz on the part of the Republican Party and Mitt Romney during the general
Presidential Election of 2012. In every DMA that was entirely composed of Michigan counties,
there was a significantly higher number of ads placed in support of Mitt Romney than Barack
Obama. In those DMA’s that included only one or two counties in MI, save Duluth, there was a
similar number of ads placed in support of both candidates. In all of the DMA’s containing only
MI counties, there were not only more ads aired in support of Romney, but also a significantly
higher number of attack ads and ads meant to show disapproval of Obama. In fact, the proportion
of attack ads present in each DMA were large, and the fact that consultants believe that these ads
are effective could be a reason why. Republican operatives must have seen MI as a state where
they could win some voters. The low proportion of Democratic ads in each of the DMA’s was
shocking to me. That also leads me to believe that Obama and his supporters must have thought
they could win the state without a large influx of ads, which they did. Further research in this
first conclusion should continue by looking for more instances in which negative or attack ads
were actually placed and look further into those regions and how they might have affected actual
vote choice through panel and longitudinal studies.
The pieces of evidence that I compiled through my survey attempted to address an area
where Johnson noticed a lack of research; “Current literature generally fails to consider the role
of consultants, either assuming that decisions are driven primarily by the candidate or
overlooking the various levels of relationships between campaign operatives and their clients.” 69
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The conversations that I held with consultants helped to illustrate a small piece of the
relationship; the placement of negative or attack ads. What I learned was that the decision to
place any type of advertisements comes after extensive research, message testing, and polling.
Pertaining to negative advertisements, it was considered an unordinary occurrence if a candidate
approached a consultant with the intention of placing these types of ads. By and large, the
consultants I spoke to were unlike the mudslinging, lie-spewing operatives that researchers
described of those early entrants into the burgeoning industry. Instead, for some, the standard of
truth is even higher when considering a negative or attack ad. Furthermore, political consultants
by and large do believe that negative or attack ads are effective, and the data shows that these
types of ads are used in large numbers. Finally, the context of an election is cited by many
consultants as what determines the effectiveness of ads. When researchers ask questions about
the use of negative or attack ads, the reasons the answers seem various is most likely because
every election is different. Researchers come from the outside but those who live it know; there
is always a time and place for negative or attack ads, context is king.
I did not set out at the beginning of this research to find a new definition for the terms
negative and attack advertising. However, speaking with one of those consultant’s that I
interviewed pointed me in this direction, and I noticed that his claim was true: researchers fail to
ask voters how they define negative or attack advertisements. Johnson’s definition was based off
of answers he gleaned from consultants and operatives, while other researches simply amended
definitions given by previous ones. Therefore, it would be worthwhile for further research to
assess what the voters view as negative advertisements. While consultants are the crafters of the
ads, the voters are the receivers. Having a clear definition of what these ads are, based on the
groups that the ad creators are wishing to effect, would give researchers greater ability to
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understand and measure how these ads play a part in the electoral process. Furthermore, the
effect that one consultant experienced, of placing negative, issue based-attack ads, and voters not
seeing it for such, should also be explored, and serve as an example of the necessity of new
research on the topic.
There are, of course, numerous factors that voters consider when deciding who to cast
their ballot for. Perhaps the largest implications of my research stems from how best to move
forward in defining and categorizing negative/attack ads. There should be more focus on how
voter’s themselves categorize the ads they are seeing, and how the issues within the ads may
impact the definition voters assign to them. My research builds upon earlier work by stepping out
of attempting to understand a voter’s psychology as affected by negative ads and detailing the
possible electoral consequences of using these types of ads.

Appendix
Survey
1. Do you consider yourself a:
a. Republican
b. Democrat
c. Independent
d. Prefer not to respond
e. Other (fill in)
2. Are most of your clients?
a. Republican
b. Democrat
c. Independent
d. Prefer not to respond
e. Other (fill in)
3. Do you see negative or attack advertising as more effective than other forms of
political communication?
a. More effective
b. Less effective
c. Just as effective
d. Negative/attack advertisements are not effective
e. Other (fill in)
4. In your opinion, does negative or attack advertising have an effect on voters' views of
candidates?
a. Yes
b. No
c. Other (Fill in)
5. In your opinion, has negative or attack advertising become a necessary part of
campaign strategy?
a. Yes
b. No
c. Other (fill in)
6. In your opinion, do political consultants contribute to or respond to partisan animosity
in the electorate?
a. Contribute
b. Respond
c. Other (fill in)
7. When advising candidates, do you recommend the use of negative or attack ads?
a. Yes
b. No
c. Other (fill in)
8. What is the most important consideration in your decision to recommend the use of
negative or attack ads?
a. Short Answer (fill in the blank)

Respondents were also asked to indicate their willingness to participate in a 10-20-minute
phone interview to gain further detail on why some consultants answered the way they did. The
following questions were posed to consultants who chose to participate in a telephone interview:
1. How do you see your role in the election process? More broadly, how do you believe the
political consulting industry has played a role in elections? Has that role been largely
positive or negative?
2. Can you give a little more detail as to why you think that political consultants may or
may not contribute to the partisan animosity and attitudes in the electorate?
3. What is the process that goes into the decision to place a negative/attack ad? Is it often
the client/candidate that proposes the use of the ad, or do you tend to recommend it first?
4. Are there any instances you can recall where you placed a negative/attack ad and felt that
the ad had an effect on the election? Please, by specific
5. Is negative and attack advertising necessary in today’s political climate?
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